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Today, malware authors not only write malicious software but also employ ob-
fuscation, polymorphism, packing and endless such evasive techniques to escape
detection by Anti-Virus Products (AVP). Besides the individual behavior of mal-
ware, the relations that exist among them play an important role for improving
malware detection. This work aims to enable malware analysts at F-Secure Labs
to explore various such relationships between malicious URLs and file samples in
addition to their individual behavior and activity. The current detection methods
at F-Secure Labs analyze unknown URLs and file samples independently with-
out taking into account the correlations that might exist between them. Such
traditional classification methods perform well but are not efficient at identifying
complex multi-stage malware that hide their activity. The interactions between
malware may include any type of network activity, dropping, downloading, etc.
For instance, an unknown downloader that connects to a malicious website which
in turn drops a malicious payload, should indeed be blacklisted. Such analysis can
help block the malware infection at its source and also comprehend the whole in-
fection chain. The outcome of this proof-of-concept study is a system that detects
new malware using graph modeling to infer their relationship to known malware
as part of the malware classification services at F-Secure.
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loader, payload, URL, file sample, graph traversal
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Idag, skadliga program inte bara skriva skadlig programvara men ocks˚a anva¨nda
fo¨rvirring, polymorfism, packning och a¨ndlo¨sa s˚adana undan tekniker fo¨r att fly
detektering av antivirusprodukter (AVP). Fo¨rutom individens beteende av skad-
lig kod, de relationer som finns mellan dem spelar en viktig roll fo¨r att fo¨rba¨ttra
detektering av skadlig kod. Detta arbete syftar till att ge skadliga analytiker
p˚a F-Secure Labs att utforska olika s˚adana relationer mellan skadliga URL: er
och fil prover i Fo¨rutom deras individuella beteende och aktivitet. De aktuel-
la detektionsmetoder p˚a F-Secure Labs analysera oka¨nda webbadresser och fil
prover oberoende utan med beaktande av de korrelationer som kan finnas mellan
dem. S˚adan traditionella klassificeringsmetoder fungerar bra men a¨r inte effektiva
p˚a att identifiera komplexa flerstegs skadlig kod som do¨ljer sin aktivitet. Inter-
aktioner mellan malware kan innefatta n˚agon typ av na¨tverksaktivitet, sla¨ppa,
nedladdning, etc. Till exempel, en oka¨nd loader som ansluter till en skadlig webb-
plats som i sin tur sla¨pper en skadlig nyttolast, bo¨r verkligen vara svartlistad. En
s˚adan analys kan hja¨lpa till att blockera malware infektion vid ka¨llan och a¨ven
fo¨rst˚a hela infektion kedja. Resultatet av denna proof-of-concept studien a¨r ett
system som uppta¨cker ny skadlig kod med hja¨lp av diagram modellering fo¨r att
sluta deras fo¨rh˚allande till ka¨nda skadliga program som en del av de skadliga
klassificerings tja¨nster p˚a F-Secure.
Nyckelord: malware, klassificering, graf modellering, graf gruvdrift, da-
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
URL Uniform Resource Locator
AV Anti-Virus
AVC Anti-Virus Client
AVP Anti-Virus Product
AVS Anti-Virus Server
APT Advanced Persistent Threat
RaaS Ransomware as a Service
SE Search Engine
BP Belief Propagation
NRS Network Reputation Service
FRS File Reputation Service
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
DNS Domain Name Service
JSON Java Server Object Notation
RID Record Identifier
IP Internet Protocol
SHA Secure Hashing Algorithm
TP True Positive
FP False Positive
TN True Negative
FN False Negative
FNR False Negative Rate
FPR False Positive Rate
TPR True Positive Rate
TNR True Negative Rate
PUA Potentially Unwanted Application
RAM Random Access Memory
VT VirusTotal
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1 Introduction
This work is a proof of concept of using graph modeling and computation techniques
for classification of unknown malware. At F-Secure Labs (hereafter referred to as
Labs) which is the backend processing systems at F-Secure, millions of URLs and
file samples are analyzed every single day in order to keep the F-Secure security
products up to date with their reputation information and successfully protect the
users from incoming threats.
A typical AVP (for instance, F-Secure SAFE) functions as follows [25]:-
• The anti-virus backend systems perform automated classification of huge num-
ber of files everyday and maintain a reputation look up service that is hosted
on the cloud. This reputation lookup service is made up of the file’s unique
keys along with their reputation labels which may be one of the following :-
trusted, malicious or unknown.
• As soon as a file is encountered on a client system, the Anti-Virus Client (AVC)
locally scans the file and uses the signatures on the client to verify the file’s
reputation.
• If the file is not detected by the local signatures on an AVC, the file’s metadata
is fetched and sent to the cloud server to fetch the corresponding reputation
label from the reputation lookup service. The reputation look up service on the
cloud is kept update by the anti-virus backend classification systems analyzing
the files and creating reputation labels for each of them.
• The client is then notified of the file verdict and if it turns out to be malicious,
the user is prevented from executing it.
• If the reputation of the file is ’unknown’ and can be executed, the file is
sent to the backend systems for further malware analysis, which is essentially
an automated and deeper investigation of the file behavior and activity in a
controlled environment.
• The results of the automated analysis are updated in the reputation lookup
service on the cloud server, as soon as possible, for detection of further threats.
Similary for URLs visited on the client’s system, a verdict is fetched from the
cloud reputation lookup service, which is kept upto date by classification processes
performed on the anti-virus backend systems. Currently, the Labs’ backend systems,
responsible for this automated malware classification, are responsible for analyz-
ing URLs and file samples and assigning a reputation label to them. One of the
most important steps in malware analysis is executing the malware in a controlled
environment called “sandbox” to capture its behavior or activity during the execu-
tion. For example, a suspicious executable file is run in a restricted environment to
capture any suspicious event that it may reveal during the process. This helps the
analysts to reproduce the actual malware infection and gain first-hand information
11
on it. However, currently, these malware entities are being handled disjointedly, it
is tedious for analysts to see potentially related URLs and file samples. Moreover,
analyzing the URL/file content and its behavior alone is not enough to predict
its maliciousness as today’s malware is packed with various evasive techniques to
escape prediction by anti-malware analysis and sandboxing techniques [25]. With the
usage of relationships among malware, anti-malware analysts might get additional
insight into its overall malware infection ecosystem to make an informed decision [25].
For instance, a malicious file is more likely to access malicious URLs than trusted
ones and vice versa. If such a relationship between a URL and a file is available
to the analysts, it would help the analysts, for instance, to predict if they are all
involved in the same malware infection chain. In addition, it also helps to reveal
anomalous behavior which might be influential in identifying potentially malicious
URLs or files. For instance, an unknown executable linking to a malicious web-
site or an unknown URL dropping malicious files are clear indicators of maliciousness.
1.1 Contributions
This work proposes a system that aims to use graph modeling and mining techniques
to represent the relationships between URLs and file samples and in turn identify the
maliciousness of unknown URLs and files from their relationships to known malware.
The major contributions of this work are listed below
• We formulate the problem of identifying potentially malicious file samples and
URLs by using graph modeling.
• We develop an iterative graph-based algorithm that can identify such URLs
and file samples that are more likely to be malicious from their relationships
to known malware.
• Using 4 months’ real classification data from F-Secure, we achieve an Accuracy
of 45% in classifying unknown file samples with a false positive rate of 0%. In
addition, our method is also able to identify unknown URLs with an Accuracy
of 80%.
1.2 Thesis Organization
The organization of this thesis is as follows. After this introduction, Chapter 2
discusses the background of malware threat landscape, current malware trends and
the distribution channels. In addition, this chapter also details about the shift
to malware for profit and why there is a need for malware classification methods.
Chapter 3 presents the concrete problem faced by anti-malware analysts at F-Secure
and the motivation behind this thesis. This chapter also discusses the list of solution
requirements that the proposed system is expected to solve. Next, Chapter 4
introduces the proposed graph modeling system and discusses about graph concepts
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in detail. Further, Chapter 5 introduces the proposed algorithm of using graph
modeling for identifying unknown malware. Then, Chapter 6 presents the results of
the proposed method along with the experiments conducted with the test datasets.
We also discuss certain interesting patterns in the resulting graphs obtained from the
test datasets in this chapter. This chapter also evaluates the solution requirements
along with the performance of the algorithm against chosen parameters and presents
the results. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with the results obtained and
presents the scope for future work.
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2 Background
This section discusses in detail how the threat landscape has evolved over the years,
with more focus on current trends and distribution channels used. In addition, we
also discuss the advancements in the field of malware classification and different
methods used by the anti-virus companies in order to keep the linchpins of the web
at bay.
2.1 Current Threat Landscape
Today, with more and more businesses moving to the cloud and more devices becoming
connected on the web, there have been increasing concerns in the area of security
and privacy. Today’s web infrastructure is constantly challenged by rapidly changing
threat landscape that makes it hard for the security professionals to stay up to
date with the imminent threats and attacks. These cyber attacks come in various
forms and are sophisticated enough to operate undetected for a long period of time.
Subsequently, it demands that organizations keep their security infrastructure under
check with improved threat intelligence methods to stay protected. The cyber attacks,
these days, can be of any form ranging from opportunistic attacks such as phishing,
spamming to more precisely targeted ones like the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT),
which is an attempt to infiltrate a specific target organization for business or political
reasons [5]. The goal of the attack extends beyond immediate financial gain and
usually involves prolonged control of the target systems by the attackers to get as
much as information on the target as possible.
2.1.1 Malware Attacks and Trends
A malware can be any type of intrusive software that brings damage to a computer
system or results in theft of critical information1. The malware authors are highly
skilled in releasing several variants of the same malware and thereby evade detection
by anti-virus products2. They take advantage of the growing number of connected
devices on the web in order to efficiently devise invincible methods of attacks. Despite
the numerous forms of attacks, more often, these malicious activities on the web are
linked to each other in one way or the other and interoperate to carry out their oper-
ations. It is much critical knowledge for the security community to understand how
these attacks relate to each other and the common characteristics they share in order
to proactively address them. Despite successfully defending umpteen threats everyday,
the anti-malware analysts still need a holistic view of the malware operation in-
frastructures to prepare for new and incoming threats or keep the impact to minimum.
Below are some of the common trends in cyber threats for the year 2016, according
to a threat report by McAfee [21]
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malware
2http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/14/technology/security/cyber-attack-hacks-security/
14
• Increase in Mobile Malware
Mobile devices have been potential targets for the attackers for many years,
irrespective of the platform, due to their ubiquitous usage. Before the advent
of the web, the primary medium of attack used to be via SMS texts. Today,
due to prolific increase in third party apps on the web stores, the focus has
shifted to exploiting security vulnerabilities on these applications, which causes
an alarming threat to security as well as privacy of mobile users. The recent
trend is to target mobile application developers and trick them into using
compromised tools for app development. Moreover, the rise in the usage of
mobile banking has created new attack surfaces to the advantage of the evil
attackers. Almost all regular malware such as ransomware, banking trojans
etc., have been created for mobile devices as well.
• Rise of the IoT Attacks
The rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) not only opens up tremendous oppor-
tunities for sharing information and staying connected but also creates endless
ways for the attackers to gain access to valuable information at ease. As opposed
to PC’s, IoT devices are not well protected end-to-end and are an easy target
for the attackers [18]. In 2014, around 100,000 everyday consumer gadgets such
as routers, televisions, refrigerators were hacked and used to send more than
750,000 spam emails3. Though IoT attacks are similar to the traditional web
attacks, the impact of such IoT attacks can be hostile and tough to recover from.
With more devices connected to each other, even minor security issues will
cause significant damage4. Mobile devices are being connected to IoT devices
such as fitness trackers, activity trackers etc., and hence, mobile malware also
target these devices. With everyday appliances becoming connected to the
web, the nature of damage that can result from these IoT attacks is not only
intellectual property but also physical safety5. Hence, with the development
of IoT devices, we should also address the challenges concerning security and
continue to research and develop new approaches to ensuring safety, security,
and privacy.
• Advanced Persistent Threats
One of the recent threats include Advanced Persistent Threats, which are
aimed at specific targets ranging from individuals to sophisticated government
organizations with intellectual information that they cannot afford to lose. The
attackers establish a backdoor to gain persistent access to the target system
and steal key assets by managing to stay under-the-hood for a long time6. An
instance of an APT attack was by a Russian government-backed group known as
3http://www.businessinsider.com/hackers-use-a-refridgerator-to-attack-businesses-2014-
1?r=US&IR=T&IR=T
4http://internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/tip/Prevent-IoT-security-threats-and-attacks-
before-its-too-late
5http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/how-hackers-violate-privacy-and-security-of-the-smart-
home/
6https://business.f-secure.com/5-advanced-persistent-threat-trends-to-expect-in-2016/
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the Dukes, which penetrated other governments and related organizations over
the course of 7 years7. It has become an atmost necessity for the organizations
and government agencies, these days, to employ sophisticated APT prevention
technologies to evade intrusion or detect any suspicious activity at the earliest.
2.1.2 Malware for Profit
There has been a paradigm shift in malware authors’ motivation to create and
distribute malware. The first generation malware were written simply for fun or to
show off programming skills and were primarily aimed at causing as much trouble to
the victims as possible. These viruses would cause malfunctioning of the computers,
damage hard drives and make the systems completely unusable. However, malware
authors realized the opportunity to extort money by means of phishing, bank fraud,
identity theft, extortion, spamming and DDoS attacks [16]. Since the focus has
shifted to financial gain, the common malware these days operate under-the-hood,
without announcing their presence, unlike first generation malware. They even
hide their traces of activity to elude detection or disable the anti-virus software
altogether8. Email is one of the primary vectors for spreading malware. The financial
gain from malware started primarily with email spam. In most cases, compromised
systems are used to send such spam emails. Although spamming has begun to drop,
spammers send billions of messages every day hoping that it reaches at least small
percentage of users who successfully fall prey to the hoax. Most spam emails contain
malware as attachments while some invite the users to click on links which are mostly
compromised and contain malicious files. Below are some of the types of malware
that gain financial benefits in various ways.
2.1.2.1 Adware
Adware is a type of malware that delivers unwanted advertisements9. Most of them
include pop-up ads on websites and software installed by the users. Adware is
regarded as an alternative offered to consumers who do not wish to pay for software10.
Mostly adware functions as a revenue generating tool for the advertisers based on
the number of users clicking on the ads. While some adware is solely designed to
generate revenue through ads, it is usually very common for adware to come bundled
with spyware that can track user’s browsing activity and steal sensitive information.
Adware/Spyware bundle is the simplest form of malware that gains profit by serving
users with tailored advertisements11.
7http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/40214/cyber-crime/the-dukes-apt.html
8https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2016/05/06/on-the-monetization-of-crypto-ransomware/
9https://www.veracode.com/blog/2012/10/common-malware-types-cybersecurity-101
10http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/A/adware.html
11https://www.veracode.com/blog/2012/10/common-malware-types-cybersecurity-101
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2.1.2.2 Banking Trojan
There has been a prolific increase in the number of banking malware that use common
tactics to steal financial information from the victims. Most of these malware leverage
the security vulnerabilities in the victim’s software to intercept internet banking
sessions. The user is directed to a fake bank website, that imitates the original, and
steal the credentials that the user inputs. The banking trojans also affect mobile
phones and steal mobile banking credentials using the same techniques. The malware
authors distribute these trojans via email attachments or web ads. By doing so,
they reach wider audience and gain hundreds of millions of dollars from successfully
deceived victims. Some examples of banking trojans include Dyre, Zeus, Dridex,
etc12.
2.1.2.3 Ransomware Trojan
Banking Trojans have been the malware of choice for cybercriminals for years. Now,
the focus has shifted to a new form of money extortion called ‘Ransomware’. A
Ransomware is a special type of malware that encrypts and locks the files on a user’s
machine and demands a ransom in order for the files to be unlocked. Their medium
of spreading is similar to banking trojans, where a user is duped into opening email
attachments or clicking on ads. One type of ransomware activates a timer stating
that a portion of your data will be destroyed every ‘X’ minutes if the money is not
received. Another type forces the victims to purchase a program to de-encrypt the
data13. In most cases, the attackers give the victims their files back once the ransom
is paid. This is to build a sense of trust among the users that makes them pay
the ransom. Ransomware is an example of malware spread using social engineering
technique to deceive the victims. The latest trend in ransomware world is providing
Ransomware as a Service (RAAS), which facilitates anyone on the web with minimal
or no knowledge of creating malware, to deploy one14. The ransom can be as little
as $10, paid through a premium text message or through bitcoins. Some of the
significant ransomware on the web are CryptoLocker, CryptoWall, Dridex, etc15.
2.1.3 Malware Distribution Channels
In the previous section, we discussed some of the current malware trends and attacks.
In this section, we give an overview of some of the common distribution channels
used by the malware.
One of the primary goals of malware authors is to distribute malware in such
a way that it impacts a wider audience and gain maximum profits. Historically,
12http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/banking-trojans-as-a-service-hits-
south-america/
13http://blogs.mdaemon.com/index.php/ransomware-and-banking-trojans-are-big-business/
14http://www.businessinsider.com/ransomware-as-a-service-is-the-next-big-cyber-crime-2015-
12?r=US&IR=T&IR=T
15http://us.norton.com/yoursecurityresource/detail.jsp?aid=rise_in_ransomware
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the most common method of malware distribution was self-propagation where the
malware would propagate exploiting the server-side vulnerabilities without the need
of user interaction [22]. But with the advent of the web, the attention has shifted
to client side vulnerabilities and social engineering for spreading infection [17]. The
attackers use multiple models for distribution of the malware. The following are
some of the commonly used distribution methods [22].
2.1.3.1 Drive by Downloads
This technique involves tricking the victim to execute malware by exploiting the
security vulnerabilities on the software used by him. The starting point of drive
by download attacks is when the user visits a website containing malicious code.
In some cases, these attacks are invisible to the user and happen without the user
consciously initiating the attack. The attack can be triggered by even simply viewing
a webpage that hosts the malicious code. Most of the times, legitimate websites that
get compromised are used by the attackers for this purpose16. The attackers host
files called exploit kits on these compromised websites, that leverage the security
vulnerabilities in the user’s browser or any other software to start the infection. The
exploit kits in turn download payloads which contain the actual malicious code.
These attacks can be prevented by keeping the operating system and softwares used
up to date with latest security updates17.
2.1.3.2 Email
Most cyber attacks are spread via e-mail. Similar to drive by downloads, this method
leverages the vulnerabilities in the email client to deliver malware attachments or links
to malicious URLs. These in turn would install malware on the users’ machines. Most
sophisticated malware are spread as spam email attachments. These attachments
may include executables or even document files that contain malicious macros. When
an unsuspecting user opens these documents, the malicious code is enabled and the
infection begins18. The anti-virus companies often advise users to not open emails
inviting to download executables or ask for financial information. Most of these email
based attacks use the technique of Social engineering to psychologically manipulate
users into downloading a malicious file or visiting a compromised URL [22] or even
divulging confidential information. Spamming and Phishing are the most common
examples of using social engineering to steal senstive information from the victims
by making them fall prey to hoaxes19.
16https://blogs.mcafee.com/consumer/drive-by-download/
17https://www.comodo.com/resources/home/newsletters/nov-10/ask-geekbuddy.php
18https://www.sophos.com/en-us/security-news-trends/security-trends/the-rise-of-document-
based-malware.aspx
19http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-awareness/5-social-engineering-attacks-
to-watch-out-for/
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2.1.3.3 Downloaders
This method of malware distribution uses one or more of the above techniques as
the initial step of the attack. For instance, malware downloaders may be distributed
to unsuspecting victims who fall prey to infected email attachments or via social
engineering methods. These are mostly the first stage of the malware infection.
These not-so-genuine programs on execution install multiple malware (referred to
as payloads) on the fly via compromised servers. The downloader files are packed
with malicious code that disables the anti-virus product’s configuration or in some
cases even disable the anti-virus altogether to prevent being detected [5]. They
connect to compromised servers to download the actual malicious payload files, which
may be any type of malware namely Ransomware, Trojan, etc. In some cases, the
downloaders do not exhibit any malicious activity such as modifying the system
components and are solely used as a medium to download the malicious payloads.
These downloaders simply connect to multiple compromised servers which host the
malicious payloads to download. Due to this unsuspecting behaviour, it is hard for
the anti-virus products to detect them by analyzing just their content or behaviour.
It is for this reason that attackers use downloaders as the first stage of multi-stage
malware infection. Since the downloaders remain undetected, they can be used to
spread additional malware payloads. This poses a challenge for the anti-malware
analysts to come up with new methods to be able to detect such malware downloaders
effectively and prevent any malware infection at its source.
2.1.4 Malware Downloader Lifecycle
In the bygone years, the lifecycle of a malware was relatively simple to understand.
According to a recent threat report by F-Secure, there are "four in’s" which form the
basis of any infection of a target system namely Inception, Intrusion, Infection and
Invasion [8].
The stages involved in a self-contained malware are briefed below and illustrated
in the Figure 2.1.
1. Inception
This is the entry phase of any malware to a target system where it poses any
minor vulnerability that can be leveraged by an attacker. This is usually done
by tricking the user into visiting harmful websites or downloading malicious
payloads.
2. Intrusion
During this phase, the attacker successfully takes advantage of the security
vulnerabilities of the software used in the target machine and gains access to
the system.
3. Infection
At this stage, the malware may or may not connect to compromised servers
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Figure 2.1: Simple Malware Lifecycle
to install malware payloads (viruses, ransomware, trojan etc) in order to
compromise the target system. These malware payloads modify the system
registry or configuration to result in malfunctioning.
4. Invasion
Finally, the infection further escalates the effects of the malicious activity.
In contrast to the simple lifecycle of malware distribution, with the advent of
new technologies on the web, the malware authors have been developing increasingly
complex malware with robust business models. One such example is using multi-stage
malware such as downloaders to spread the infection. The downloaders are malicious
programs which form the first stage of a multi-stage infection. These programs on
execution install additional malicious payloads and infect the victim’s system20. The
downloader contacts remote hosts on the fly to download the actual malware as
shown in Figure 2.2. It is challenging for versatile anti-virus products to blacklist
downloaders due to the fact that they are simply used as tools to spread infection
and are not always malicious themselves. Due to this fact, these downloaders remain
under-the-hood for a long time and are recycled to spread new variants of malware
payloads. However, these downloaders are at the source of the chain of maliciousness
and blacklisting them is significant to prevent any infection at the foundation.
20https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/evolution_of_dridex.html
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Figure 2.2: Malware Downloader Lifecycle
2.2 Malware Classification methods
There are a number of techniques used by anti-malware companies to detect new
malicious URLs and file samples. These methods include techniques as simple
as blacklisting to more complex methods using machine learning. Lightweight
classification methods are performed on the Anti-Virus Client’s (AVC) end in order
to provide a reputation as soon as possible and to remain protected from existing
threats. These are termed as Client-side methods which include Signature-based
and Heuristic-based methods of malware classification. However, in order to prevent
zero-day attacks and new malware variants, there is a necessity to apply intelligent
mechanisms to predict malware [2]. This usually involves sophisticated execution and
additional hardware resources that they are performed on the Anti-Virus Server’s side
(AVS). These methods are termed as Server-side methods which include Learning-
based and Graph-based methods of malware classification.
The Figure 2.3 shows the hierarcy of the different classification methods discussed
in the next sections.
2.2.1 Client-side Methods
This section gives a brief overview of some of the methods used by the AVC to
blacklist malware.
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Figure 2.3: Malware Classification Methods
2.2.1.1 Signature-based detection
A malware signature is similar to a fingerprint that can be used to detect and
identify a particular type of malware21. The AVC validates the files on the user’s
machine against a known list of malware signatures. This list of known malware
is generally stored locally and queried by the AVC whenever needed. Today, in
addition to local signatures, some of the signatures are stored on a cloud server
and queried by the AVC. For instance, F-Secure has a Cloud Reputation Service
called F-Secure Security Cloud, that stores information about the list of blacklisted
files and URLs and keeps it upto date with new malware reputation label[7]. The
attackers constantly change their modus-operandi to avoid being detected while the
anti-virus companies discover new methods from time to time to prevent new threats.
Once the malware gets blacklisted by the AV, the users are proactively informed
and prevented from getting infected by the malware. When a user, who has the
AVC installed on his machine, visits a URL or opens a file sample, its reputation is
verified against the reputation service to check if it is blacklisted and thereby prevent
him/her from getting infected by potential malware. Usually the blacklisting process
involves not only blocking the malware outright but also labeling them into categories
namely ’adult’, ’violence’, ’hate’, etc. that will let the user make an informed decision.
However, the main drawback of signature-based methods is that the anti-virus cannot
detect new malware variants and zero-day threats for which signatures are not known
yet22.
2.2.1.2 Heuristic-based methods
In this method, the AVC examines the files for suspicious aspects without an exact
signature match. For instance, the AVC might look for suspicious instructions or
malicious code in the file which is indicative of malicious activity. The AVC might
21http://www.webopedia.com/
22https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2016/07/08/whats-the-deal-with-detection-logic/
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also run the file in a virtual environment to examine the activity of the file, without
noticeably slowing down the system. The biggest drawback of heuristic-based methods
is that without enough information, legitimate files can inadvertently categorized as
malicious23.
2.2.2 Server-side Methods
In this section, we will discuss some of the behaviour based-classification methods
used by the AVS to generate reputation labels for files and URLs. These methods
require huge processing power such that they cannot be performed on the AVC.
However, the classification results of these methods are constantly updated in the
cloud server for the AVC to query from.
2.2.2.1 Machine Learning-based Methods
With the advancements in the field of big data, machine learning models are used
to predict maliciousness of unknown files and URLs. It includes the extraction of
significant features from the URLs and using intelligent classification techniques such
as decision trees, Naive Bayes etc., to automatically classify the URLs into different
categories [25].
Ma et al. [15] observed URL reputation as a binary classification problem by training
the machine learning model with lexical and host-based features of URLs. A key
advantage of machine learning-based methods is their ability to predict the mali-
ciousness of new and unknown URLs without the need of analyzing the content of
the URLs extensively [15].
Rieck et al. [20] used clustering and classification methods to group malware with
similar behavior based on run-time behavior analysis. In both static and dynamic
methods, machine learning models are applicable to any context in which the malware
is encountered. Though these machine learning-based methods perform better than
the heuristic and signature-based methods in predicting new and unseen malware,
there is still a high degree of difficulty in minimizing false positives and determining
which features to use in the training phase.
2.2.2.2 Graph-based Methods
The machine learning techniques are each successful in their own way in categorizing
malware samples, but most of them are isolated learning techniques that consider
the individual features of input samples for training and do not take into account
the relationships between the samples. While analyzing individual characteristics of
malware helps a great deal in malware classification, studying the relationships among
them may expose the interdependence among them and improve the performance
of classification [4]. With traditional methods, which use individual properties of
23http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/tip/How-antivirus-software-works-Virus-detection-
techniques
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malware, the attackers use several obfuscation methods which can affect the feature
selection process of classification based methods. In addition, these methods do not
enable anti-malware analysts to get a complete view of the malware infection chain.
This particularly results in labor-intensive work for the analysts to correlate the
data and gather deep insight. Graph-based malware detection is based on graph
theoretical approach where malware samples and URLs are modelled as vertices and
the relationships between are modelled as edges. Usage of graph mining techniques
can help to find malicious entities, anamolous relationships between the entities or
extract similar patterns within the data. There is already abundant research on the
usage of graph theory, in combination with other methods, for malware detection [4].
2.3 Existing Reputation System Overview
This section gives an overview of the existing architecture of backend malware
classification systems at F-Secure. The current backend malware classification
systems at F-Secure perform extensive automated analysis of file samples and URLs
that cannot be handled by the anti-virus clients themselves due to the large processing
power needed for the purpose. Usually, it involves executing the file samples and
visiting the URLs in a simulated fashion inside sand-boxed environments24 in order
to capture their behavior. The data captured during their execution in an isolated
environment provides significant information about the entities and helps in their
classification. The backend classification systems at Labs are mainly composed of
two separate services namely Network Reputation Service (NRS), for classification
of URLs and File Reputation Service (FRS), for classification of file samples. The
following sections give an overview of these services.
2.3.1 Network Reputation Service
The Network Reputation Service (NRS) is composed of a number of subsystems which
are responsible for classifying URLs into appropriate categories or assigning reputation
labels to them. These subsystems analyze the content of the URLs or the files
downloaded from them to assign such labels. These labels include ’trusted’, ’malicious’
or ’unknown’. For instance, if a URL on analysis is seen to download malicious file
samples, then the URL is more likely to be labelled as ’malicious’. In some cases,
the URLs are also set categories namely ’hate’,’violence’,’adult’, etc depending on
content analysis. The NRS subsystems include sand-boxed environments which visit
the URLs in an automated and controlled way to understand their behavior and
record additional information for their analysis. Any executable file downloaded from
the URL under scrutiny, is captured and fed back to the File Reputation Service
(explained below) which is responsible for classification of the files25.
24http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/sandbox
25https://labsblog.f-secure.com/
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2.3.2 File Reputation Service
The FRS backend systems are composed of a number of automated subsystems
which run through the process of classifying file samples as ’trusted’, ’malicious’
or ‘unknown’. A file sample is labelled as ’malicious’ if, on analysis, it is seen to
connect to known malicious URLs. Similar to the NRS,file samples are executed in
a controlled environment and their network activities are recorded. These network
events might include HTTP, TCP requests etc., to several other URLs. These URLs
are fed back to the NRS systems for their classification. Some file samples may
download additional files (payloads) in the process which are also fed back to the
FRS. Figure 2.4 represents the NRS and FRS combined system flow from end to
end.
Figure 2.4: NRS and FRS system architecture
2.4 Literature Review
This section discusses some of the noticeable work in the field of malware classification.
Several types of malware classification methods have been used for different purposes.
Graph-based malware classification methods have been used extensively to detect
different kind of spam campaigns. Venzhega et al. [23] devised an effective method
for Yandex Search Engine (SE) to detect malware distributors using website-file
hosting relationships. The system used the log of downloads of files linked from
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webpages. They modelled this data as a bi-partite graph in order to detect different
kinds of spam.
Our method uses a NoSQL graph database to model and visualize the malware
data and relationships, which is similar to the work by Dinh et al. [6]. They developed
a software framework for spam campaign detection, analysis and investigation of
spam emails using graph database modeling. This work also involves visualization of
spam campaigns and their clusters to understand the whole operating infrastructure.
One more notable research work using graph modeling and mining techniques for
spam detection was by Becchetti et al. [3]. This work performs statistical analysis of
large collection of web pages by studying graph metrics such as degree correlations,
number of neighbors, etc. With the increasing usage of online services and social
media, some work have focussed on tackling attacks on such services due to their
wide spread usage. Huang et al. [9] develops a service called SocialWatch, that
uses user-user social relationships to detect attacker-created accounts and hijacked
accounts at a large scale. They make use of a set of graph properties including degree
and PageRank for detecting attack behaviours.
There is also commendable work that are similar to our concept in categorizing
malware using their relationships to other malware using graphs.
Akiyama et al. [1] proposed an effective blacklisting method to identify unknown
URLs. The work is based on the assumption that a newly created malicious URL
is in the structural neighborhood of a known malicious URL owned by the same
adversary. The system uses the capabilities of a search engine in order to fetch
unknown URLs in the webspace of known malicious URLs. It then uses static and
dynamic content analysis on the candidate URLs to identify actual malicious URLs.
This method is similar to our method in identifying unknown URLs using their
relationship to known malicious URLs, although our method does not include the
additional overhead of analyzing the content of the malware.
Chau et al. [4] presented a malware classification system that analyzes bi-partite
graphs representing machine-file relationships.The system uses Belief Propagation
(BP) algorithm to calculate reputation score for each of the application files that
a user launches in his machine. The work uses machine learning and data mining
algorithms to infer the goodness of an application. This work is highly similar to
our method concept of analyzing URL-file relationships to infer the maliciousness
of unknown URLs and files. Although, our method attempts to identify unknown
URLs and files without the use of machine learning algorithms.
Similar to using relationships of URLs to other URLs, there is also work that
leverages relationships of files to other files. Ye et al. [25] developed an intelligent
malware classification model called Valkyrie, which utilizes both file content and
relationships with one another in the form of graphs. The system is based on the
assumption that two files are related if they are shared by the same client. The system
uses a classification model with features from file content and relationships and is
proven to have detected new malware samples not identified by other anti-viruses.
In addition to using file relations, URL relationships are also used to predict
malicious communities. Li-xiong et al. [12] proposed a graph-based method to detect
malicious URLs based on URL-URL relationships by means of the URLs visited by
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the same users. This method thereby detects malicious communities.
While there is good amount of work in analyzing file-file and URL-URL rela-
tionships, there is also significant work in identifying malicious downloaders and
payloads using graph analysis, which is partly similar to our method. Kwon et
al. [11] developed a graph-based model of the download activities on end-hosts to
study the difference in growth patterns of benign and malicious downloader-payload
graphs. This paper also applies a machine learning classification model on top of
these downloader graphs to automatically learn models of malicious download graphs
[11]. Our method applies similar graph modeling concepts in predicting unknown
URLs and files based on the file-URL relationships. It is worth noting that simply by
using graph modeling and mining techniques, our method is capable of identifying
unknown files and URLs not identified by other anti-viruses.
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3 Problem Statement
This chapter formulates the definite problem faced by the malware analysts at Labs
and the motivation behind this work. Also, we discuss the definite requirements that
the solution is expected to meet.
3.1 Problem Description
Nowadays, one of the common methods used by the malware authors to distribute
malware is to install malicious downloaders via techniques such as drive-by-downloads,
social engineering or regular e-mail attachments. In majority of the cases, the down-
loaders as such may not be inherently malicious and hence remain undetected by
the anti-malware products. These software, in turn, download a variety of malicious
payloads, which are responsible for spreading the actual infection to the users’ ma-
chines. The downloaders also hide traces of such activity to evade detection. Due
to such obfuscation behavior, these malicious downloader programs can go under-
the-hood for several days or months, continuing to spread more such malware variants.
The current malware classification services at Labs use individual properties and
the behavior of malware for blacklisting them but do not leverage their relationship
information with one another. In addition to the classification methods used at Labs,
analyzing multi-stage malware, especially downloader-payload relationships would
be useful to the analysts to uncover the entire infection chain. Currently, there is no
automated way of classifying malware based on the downloader-payload relationships
and the analysts at Labs resort to manual work for classifying such malware.
The proposed system aims to provide an automated classification method for
identifying unknown samples and URLs and thereby improve the classification per-
formance of the current malware classification methods at F-Secure. This system
functions as a server-side classification method and aims to identify unknown sam-
ples by co-relating them with known malware. This would also help the analysts
understand the complete picture of the participants of an infection chain.
3.2 Solution Requirements
The goal of the thesis is to develop a system for anti-malware analysts to iden-
tify unknown samples and URLs as potentially malicious, with the help of their
neighborhood information. In order to achieve the goal of this thesis, the following
requirements are expected to be met.
• Requirement R1:
The first requirement is to effectively report potentially malicious downloader
samples and URLs using graph traversal and mining techniques with a classifi-
cation accuracy of at least 50%.
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• Requirement R2:
The second requirement is the ability of the system to enable anti-malware
analysts explore patterns and similarities between different malware families
easier and faster than the current classification system.
• Requirement R3:
The third requirement is the ability of the method to produce false positive rate
of not more than 3%, in the process of identifying potential malware candidates.
It is important to note that reporting low false negatives is not a significant
requirement when compared to low false positives because high false positive
rate can result in potential issues to the users and the anti-virus companies
themselves. Moreover, since this solution acts as a supplement to the existing
malware classification methods at F-Secure, maintaining a low false positive
rate is crucial for the overall classification accuracy of the AVP.
• Requirement R4:
The final requirement is the efficiency of the system in improving the classifi-
cation performance of the current malware classification systems by at least
10%.
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4 Data Modeling and Design
This section discusses the limitations of the existing system described in Chapter 2
and proposes our system design.
4.1 Limitations of the Existing Design
In order to evade detections by anti-virus softwares, the malware authors incorporate
complex stages into the malware lifecycle making it hard for the anti-malware
products to blacklist them effectively [19]. For instance, the URL blacklists can
often be circumvented by distributing malware downloads from frequently changing
domains. Similarly, the file blacklists can be evaded by using multiple installers or
downloaders that appear legitimate but download supplementary malware payloads
[10]. The existing classification systems at Labs are not effective in classifying
multi-phase malware such as downloaders, since they do not examine the relationship
information between the URLs and the file samples analyzed. Currently, though
the NRS and the FRS systems feed related file and URL information to each other
respectively, as shown in Figure 2.4, they do not leverage these relationships in order
to make blacklisting decisions for malware. The following section introduces the
proposed system which uses File-URL relationships in order to blacklist malware.
4.2 System Design
Figure 4.1: Solution Overview
The proposed solution co-relates the relationship information between the NRS
and the FRS services using graph modeling as shown in Figure 4.1. The graph is
modelled with files, URLs and the relationships between them which include ‘File
Download’ activity of a URL and ‘Network Connection’ activity of a file sample. The
30
‘File Download‘ activity is a relation between a URL and the executable file that
was downloaded from it. The ‘Network Activity’ relation represents the network
events such as HTTP GET made by a file sample to a URL. This correlation
can be represented in the form of a bipartite graph model, which can be used to
determine the maliciousness of unknown malware samples from their relationship to
other malware. For simplicity purposes, in the rest of the thesis, the ’File Download’
relation is called ’Download’ and ’Network Connection’ relation is called ’Activity’.
The samples, URLs and their relationships are represented as a bipartite graph G (V,
E) where V, a vertex, represents a URL or a file sample and E, an edge, represents
the relationship between a URL and a file and vice versa. Though there are several
different types of relationships between URLs and samples, in the proposed solution,
they are limited to only ‘Download’ and ‘Activity’ relations.
Figure 4.2: Bipartite Graph Example
The graph is bipartite as there is no link among the URLs or between the files
themselves but only between the URLs and files. Figure 4.2 shows a sample bi-
partite graph representation of data with samples, URLs and their relationships.
For instance, from the model graph, the files Sample1 and Sample4 are downloader
samples, since they download payloads via URL1 and URL2, respectively. The files
Sample2, Sample3 and Sample5 are payloads while the URLs are called download
URLs. The highlighted URLs and files are known to be malicious while the repu-
tation of others is unknown. We can observe that the payload files, Sample2 and
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Sample3, both malicious, are downloaded from URL1 and URL2 respectively, whose
classification is not known.Thus, there is reason to suspect that these URLs are likely
to be malicious as only malicious samples are downloaded from them. Moreover,
the downloader samples Sample1 and Sample4 that access these malicious URLs
are also more inclined to be malicious, since no clean file would access malicious
URLs. Similarly, we already know that URL3 is malicious. The downloader sample
Sample4 that connects to URL3 is likely to be malicious because Sample4 only talks
to malicious URLs, URL2 (inferred earlier) and URL3. However, it is important to
note that the payload Sample5 may or may not be malicious since files downloaded
from a malicious URL are not necessarily malware. It is also worth noting that in
this work, a single download URL downloads a single payload but a single payload
can be downloaded from multiple download URLs. Moreover, a payload sample can
also act as a downloader and download other payloads. This is common in cases of
malware that use multiple levels of distribution.
Thus, from a dataset containing downloaders, payloads and download URLs, the
maliciousness of unknown downloaders and download URLs can be predicted if we
know the reputation labels of the payloads. It is clear that, from the analysis of
anomalous relationships between the URLs and the file samples, we can identify
unknown files or URLs that are more likely to be malicious but were not identified
by traditional content-based and behaviour-based methods that are currently used
at F-Secure. However, manual analysis of such patterns is time consuming for the
anti-malware analysts, owing to the huge amounts of data crunched by the classifi-
cation systems every single day [14]. Thus, to automate this process, we propose
a graph-based malware classification algorithm to classify unknown files and URLs
based on their relationships with existing malware.
The proposed method is mainly based on the following two assumptions:
1. A URL is likely to be malicious, if it downloads a malicious payload
A URL is likely to be malicious, if the file downloaded from it is classified as
malicious. This is because no clean URL would point to a malicious payload.
In most cases, legitimate servers that have security vulnerabilities are used
by the attackers for spreading malware payloads. Such a URL is temporarily
classified as malicious until the malicious payload is removed from it. Moreover,
such URLs are used by malware downloaders as distribution mediums.
2. A file sample is likely to be malicious, if it connects to one or more URLs
that download malicious payloads A file sample is more likely to be malicious
if it connects to a malicious URL since no clean file would access a malicious
URL. In most cases, the files send HTTP GET requests to webpages hosted on
compromised servers to download malicious payloads into the victim’s machine.
These files are downloader files that may or may not be inherently malicious
and simply connect to compromised servers in order to download payloads.
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4.3 Graph Data modeling
Our system uses graph modeling technique where the file samples and URLs are
represented as graph vertices and the relationships between them become the edges.
We model this data using an open-source multimodal graph database called OrientDB,
where each node and its metadata is stored in the form of a JSON document.
OrientDB is an Open-Source, Multi-Model NoSQL database that combines the
power of graphs and the flexibility of documents into one scalable, high-performance
operational database26.The advantage of OrientDB over other graph databases is
that it is schema-less and fits our use case of modeling URLs and file samples with
metadata. It also supports data visualization that can be used by the anti-malware
analysts to explore malware communities and infection chains.
We describe the terminologies used to model our graph below.
1. Sample Vertex
The FRS systems store the metadata of the file samples analyzed in the
sandboxed environments, including the file properties and its network activity.
The network events might include HTTP or HTTPS requests to other URLs
which may or may not download additional malware. Subsequently, these URLs
are fed back to the NRS systems for their automated analysis. It is important
to note that a sample analyzed can be either a downloader or a payload.
2. URL Vertex
The NRS systems store the metadata of the URLs analyzed by the sandboxed
environments, including the URL properties and the files downloaded from the
URL. A multi-phase malware such as a downloader may use several distribution
URLs to download payloads. These payload samples are fed back to the FRS
system for analysis. It is significant to note that a URL may or may not
download a payload.
3. Activity Edge
The network events such as HTTP GET or HTTP POST, created by the file
samples to other URLs represent the ‘Activity’ edge in the graph between a
downloader sample and a URL vertex.
4. Download Edge
A ’Download ’edge is created in the graph between a URL and a payload
sample vertex, when a payload is downloaded from the URL. However, it is
not always necessary for a URL to download a payload.
26http://orientdb.com/
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4.4 Dataset Creation
The graphs are constructed in OrientDB graph database with vertices and edges. The
URLs and their metadata are fetched from the NRS systems to form the URL vertex
in OrientDB. We also fetch the metadata of the payload samples downloaded from
those URLs to form the ’Download’ edge data model. Similarly, the downloader files
and their metadata are fetched from the FRS systems to make the file vertex. We
also fetch the metadata of the URLs that have been contacted by these downloaders.
These form the ’Activity’ edge data model in the graph.
Figure 4.3: Graph Data model
Figure 4.3 shows the overall data model of the graph as modelled in OrientDB
graph database. The graph is made up of Sample and URL vertices, along with
their metadata attributes, and the edges between them. In OrientDB, each sample
and URL vertex is identified by a physical Record Identifier called RID, which is
randomly generated during creation of the data. It is also important to note that the
links between the vertices are stored as physical edge references to avoid the need of
using JOINs as in relational databases.
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5 Implementation
This section introduces the graph-based algorithm for classification of malicious
downloader samples. The input data to the algorithm is a graph consisting of
downloader and payload samples and URLs.
5.1 The Graph-based Method
We define the suspicion score s for a sample or a URL as a score of possibility that
the sample or URL is malicious. It is a non-negative number in the range of 0-1.
Based on the assumptions made in Chapter 4, we develop an iterative algorithm to
calculate the suspicion scores of downloader samples and classify them as ‘malicious’,
if the score exceeds certain threshold t. We also flag the download URLs as ‘malicious’
in the process. In the bi-partite graph representation, the suspicion score of a node
is calculated based on the ‘malicious’ labels of its immediate neighbors. The value is
calculated depending on how many of the neighbours of a node are malicious. The
samples with a suspicion score of 0 are completely trusted samples while those with
higher score are more likely to be malicious.
Suspicion Score s = Number of malicious neighboursTotal number of neighbours
We develop the graph-based algorithm 1, which takes the input graph dataset
and iteratively explores the downloader samples in the neighborhood of ‘malicious’
payloads via their download URLs. We already know that each file sample and URL
has a reputation label which may be ’malicious’,’trusted’ or ’unknown’. We calculate
the suspicion scores of the downloader file samples based on the ‘malicious’ reputation
labels of their immediate neighbour URLs. As a result, the downloader samples with a
suspicion score of t or more are marked as ’malicious’. In the algorithm, the function
calls to get the neighborhood URLs of a sample and neighborhood downloaders
of a URL are specified in lines 9 and 13. These functions effectively traverse the
immediate neighbors of a node in the graph and fetch their neighbour vertices. The
pseudo code for these functions, getNeighbourUrls and getNeighborDownloaders, are
not described here for simplicity purposes.
5.1.1 The Algorithm
The algorithm 1 presents the pseudocode with Graph G as the input and list of
malicious downloaders and download URLs as the output. It is worth recollecting
that the input graph dataset is created from the NRS and the FRS systems. The
algorithm traverses the input graph starting from payload samples that are known
to be malicious. It subsequently traverses the neighbor download URLs and in turn
the downloader samples connected to those download URLs assigning a suspicion
score to each of the downloader samples.
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Thus, the algorithm outputs a list of downloader samples that are most likely
to be malicious but are currently unknown to the existing malware classification
systems. In addition, it also outputs a list of download URLs which are likely to be
malicious. The algorithm uses known malicious samples to identify unknown URLs
and file samples. Hence, given an input graph dataset, this algorithm provides a
list of malicious downloaders and download URLs that are currently unknown to
the existing malware classification systems at F-Secure and thereby improves the
existing classification performance.
The algorithm runs until we have traversed all of the ‘malicious’ payloads in the
input graph dataset. The result of the iterations is a set of malicious download URLs
and malicious downloaders with their suspicion scores. Assuming that input graph G
has u download URLs, d downloaders and p payloads, the running time of a single
iteration of the algorithm will be O(u + d + p).
Algorithm 1 To recursively fetch malicious downloader samples by traversing out
of malicious payload samples in an input graph
1: procedure getMaliciousDownloaders(t)
2: G← Input Graph
3: t← Suspicion Score threshold
4: maliciousSamples← []
5: maliciousUrls← []
6: suspicionScore← 0
7: for each sample ∈ getV ertices(G) do
8: if sample.type = ‘payload’ & sample.reputation = ’malicious’ then
9: DOWNLOAD_URL← getNeighbourUrls(sample)
10: for each d_url ∈ DOWNLOAD_URL do
11: d_url.reputation← ‘malicious’
12: maliciousUrls.add(d_url)
13: DOWNLOADER← getNeighbourDownloaders(d_url)
14: for each s ∈ DOWNLOADER do
15: if s NOT IN maliciousSamples then
16: URL← getNeighbourUrls(s)
17: s.suspicionScore ← count(URL.reputation =′
malicious′)/count(URL)
18: else
19: continue
20: if s.suspicionScore > t then
21: maliciousSamples.add(s)
return maliciousSamples,maliciousUrls
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5.1.2 Challenges in our Method
Our method is based on the assumptions that, an unknown file sample is likely to
be malicious if it connects to a malicious URL which in turn downloads a malicious
payload. Due to this assumption, our algorithm explores only the neighborhood
of malicious payloads and ignores the payload samples for which the reputation is
unknown. Also, since our method is based on relationships, there is not enough
information to decide on the maliciousness of unknown URLs downloading unknown
payloads. Similarly, there is little information to decide the maliciousness of unknown
downloader samples that connect to unknown URLs and download unknown payloads.
Hence, this method works the best, if the proportion of malicious payloads in the
input dataset is significant enough to make a decision. Moreover, the suspicion score
threshold of t, used for experimental purposes, is not a fixed number and can be
varied to decide which score brings the best results.
One more challenge of the method is that since it works on static input dataset,
there is a risk of using outdated malware reputation data, especially that of URLs.
We know that a malware’s reputation can change from time to time. For instance, a
URL which is currently malicious can become trusted once the infection is removed
and vice versa. Hence, there is a need for the algorithm to fetch real-time information
than use static data to make the decisions.
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6 Results and Evaluation
This section explains in detail the experiments conducted against the proposed
algorithm with real malware dataset from F-Secure.
The test dataset used for the experiments consists of real malware data from F-Secure.
F-Secure malware classification systems analyze and classify millions of file samples
and URLs everyday in order to protect their users from imminent threats. This
malware data is collected in the form of file samples, URLs, emails, IP addresses, to
name a few. F-Secure maintains a blacklist of the malicious URLs and file samples
and keep them up to date with several malware detection and analysis methods. If
the users of F-Secure security products come across the blacklisted malware samples
or URLs, they are successfully protected from falling prey to the infections. These
samples are gathered from honeypots, customer submissions and from partner sample
feeds such as those provided by VirusTotal. VirusTotal27 is an online service by
Google that has the reputation information of malicious files and URLs aggregated
from the scan results of over 55 anti-virus engines, website scanners and security
companies. Given a unique SHA1 value (of a URL or a file sample), VirusTotal will
provide results from multiple anti-virus vendors whether the particular file or URL
is malicious or not.
In this section, we conduct two sets of experimental studies using our malware
datasets obtained from F-Secure backend systems to fully evaluate the efficiency of
the proposed algorithm:
1. In the first part of experiments, we evaluate the efficiency of the proposed
graph based malware classification method.
2. In the second part of experiments, we present some common patterns that are
visible in the graph model of malware data.
6.1 Evaluation metrics
We measure the malware classification accuracy of the proposed system using the
following evaluation metrics:
• True Positive Rate (TPR): The ratio of malware samples (both files and
URLs) correctly classified as ‘malicious’ by the system. It is also known as
Recall.
TPR = TP
TP + FN
• True Negative Rate (TNR): The ratio of samples (both files and URLs)
correctly classified as ‘not malicious’ by the system.
TNR = TN
TN + FP
27https://www.virustotal.com/en/documentation/
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• False Positive Rate (FPR): The ratio of samples (both files and URLs)
misclassified as ‘malicious’ by the system.
FPR = FP
FP + TN
• False Negative Rate (FNR): The ratio of malware samples (both files and
URLs) misclassified as ‘not malicious’ by the system.
FNR = FN
FN + TP
• Accuracy:
Accuracy is the proportion of true results, either true positive or true negative,
in a population. It measures the degree of veracity of a diagnostic test on a
condition28.
Accuracy = TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
• Precision:
Precision defines how many of the returned samples are correctly classified
as malicious out of the total number of files or URLs (both legitimate and
malicious) identified as malware. It is otherwise known as positive predictive
value29.
Precision = TP
TP + FP
6.2 Dataset Description and Ground Truth Labelling
We used the malware data analyzed by F-Secure between March and June, 2016
for this experiment. The reason for choosing the timeline is to consider only the
latest malware data for the experiments, in order to focus on the new and preva-
lent threats and ignore information which may be outdated. All these data have
been analyzed by sandboxed environments at least once during the specified time-
line and a reputation has been assigned to each of them if found to be malicious,
clean or unknown. The dataset obtained from F-Secure backend systems consists
of 33,368 unique file samples and 207,865 unique URLs. Out of these numbers,
we only consider the file samples that are either a ‘downloader’ or a ‘payload’ and
the URLs that are download URLs. This amounts to 1,735 unique downloader
file samples and 199 payload file samples. The number of ‘download URLs’ which
connect these downloaders and payloads is 452. Although, the test dataset does not
28http://www.lexjansen.com/nesug/nesug10/hl/hl07.pdf
29https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precision_and_recall
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cover all malware families extensively, it represents some of the significant threats
that were prevalent during this time period. These statistics are tabulated in Table 6.1
It is also worth noting that the dataset comprises 1,551 malicious, 25 clean, 357
unknown file samples (both downloaders and payloads) along with 407 malicious,
38 clean and 7 unknown download URLs. All the experimental studies have been
conducted in a cloud environment with Debian GNU/Linux 8.2 operating system
with 2 GB of RAM and 20GB of disk space.
Type Numbers
Unique files 33,368
Unique URLs 207,865
Unique downloader samples 1,735
Unique payload samples 199
Unique download URLs 452
Table 6.1: Statistics of the test dataset
To check the ground truth of the downloader file samples classified by the algorithm,
the results of the experiments are verified against F-Secure malware classification
system and VirusTotal to confirm if they are in fact malicious. First, the SHA1
values of the downloader samples identified as malicious by our algorithm are looked
up against F-Secure malware classification system. If not identified by F-Secure, we
use VirusTotal to verify the maliciousness of a particular file sample. If at least 5
anti-virus engines classify the sample as malicious, the sample is indeed considered
malicious. This is to make sure that false positives by other anti-virus engines are
not considered as ground truth [13].
6.3 Accuracy of the Method
This section discusses the experiments conducted with the input dataset and calcu-
lates the accuracy of the method in each of them.
6.3.1 Classification of downloaders
In F-Secure malware classification system, there are many newly found malicious
URLs every day via traditional methods. The most dangerous URLs that need
attention are the ones, which when visited, download payloads that host malicious
code and affect the victim’s system. Some examples of malicious URLs found by
traditional malware classification methods are shown in Table 6.2.
In the first set of experiments, we use the algorithm (introduced in previous section)
to identify ‘potentially suspicious’ downloader file samples that download malicious
payloads through one or more download URLs.
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For performing this experiment, the reputation labels of the downloader file samples
were removed and passed as input to the algorithm along with their relationships
with other URLs and files. The algorithm identifies the downloader samples that are
‘potentially suspicious’ along with their suspicion scores based on their neighborhood.
These malware downloaders are the source of any infection and most of them do
not exhibit any malicious behavior themselves and hence remain undetected for a
long time. By exploring the neighborhood of the downloader samples, we assign a
suspicion score to each of the downloader samples based on the reputation labels of
their neighbours. The unlabeled downloader samples with a suspicion score above a
certain threshold t are filtered out as ‘potentially malicious’ from the input dataset.
For the first iteration of the experiment, we set the suspicion score threshold as 0.3
and study the results.
Malicious URLs
http://findjj12.3eeweb.com/popup.exe
http://cos.myqcloud.com/11001025/yun/AtShz.rar
http://mpower.lv/system/cache/word.exe
http://secuservernet18.com/dds/t58.exe
http://down.fyeshs.com/jd_rg0cfc_xax7009_1.exe
Table 6.2: Sample malicious URLs
From the input dataset, out of the 1,735 unlabeled downloader samples present
in the dataset, 1,052 samples were marked as malicious by the algorithm with a
suspicion score of 0.3 or more while 683 samples were classified as trusted. The
reputation of these samples were verified against the ground truth and substantiated
that they were actually malicious. With these results, we check the ground truth to
verify the maliciousness of all the samples. About 84 of the 1,052 samples were not
identified by F-Secure engine but from VirusTotal and manual analysis. Hence, for a
suspicion score threshold of 0.3, this method increases the existing backend malware
classification rate of F-Secure by about 8%.
It is worth noting that there were 10 downloader samples listed in Table 6.3
with a suspicion score of more than 0.3 but were identified neither by F-Secure
engine nor by any anti-virus on VirusTotal. These were identified as ‘Potentially
Unwanted Applications’ (PUA) by manually analyzing them with the help of anti-
malware analysts at Labs. These samples are perfect examples of malware samples
that do not exhibit any malicious behavior as such but use compromised servers
as their distribution medium to spread malware. This proves that the algorithm
was able to find potentially malicious files not identified by any other anti-virus engine.
We repeat the experiment with a higher suspicion score threshold of 0.4 and
analyze the results. For the new suspicion score of 0.4, out of the 1,735 unlabeled
downloader samples found in the dataset, 746 samples were marked as malicious
by the algorithm while 989 samples were classified as trusted. The results of this
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Downloader SHA1 Suspicion score (0-1)
6b2e3d5fd183d96ea2027b8eb75e28ce9519669f 1
1fc2c3f2d53f69c9c946f7491d06db2f5f177aad 0.6
f1b501c52c4f523fc3df00b54cfd4af21531b0f8 0.4
1f96645c825a6a252e6de29f0cb3a140306be4a5 0.6
918389409efca718e723aa0dcf5219214935f820 0.6
0e1f282734f3b868081f04e743fcc7ef83b1d718 0.6
afcce5f141e6406d70d0c2754646bc0871c3c4fa 0.6
08edc726ad08a6e3e87eaa864e03f7305290315e 0.6
2f4e4757e18ac7e1b9a4262607fc504bdba4593c 0.6
4132e710e3dc3a902d79379d1c563f89c2c9c590 0.6
Table 6.3: Unknown malware downloaders
experiment are tabulated in Table 6.4 for both the suspicion scores. The maliciousness
of these samples were verified against the ground truth and the metrics for both
iterations are listed in Table 6.5.
Type Suspicion score
(0.3)
Suspicion score
(0.4)
Total unlabelled download-
ers
1,735 1,735
Malicious 1052 746
Trusted 683 989
Table 6.4: Results of the experiment
Downloaders classified
as ‘malicious’
Suspicion score
(0.3)
Suspicion score
(0.4)
F-Secure 967 665
VirusTotal (VT) 74 71
Manual analysis 10 10
By our method = Sum( F-
Secure + VT +Manual anal-
ysis)
1051 746
False Positives (FP) 1 0
Table 6.5: Statistics of the classification
It it also worth highlighting the fact that using a suspicion score of 0.3 returned
a low FPR of 2.3% and an accuracy of 0.62. For a suspicion score threshold of 0.4,
this method increases the existing malware classification rate of F-Secure backend
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classification by about 10%. The overall accuracy metrics for both iterations of this
experiment are listed in Table 6.6. From the table, it is clear that the FPR has
dropped to 0 and the Precision is 100%
Measure Suspicion score (0.3) Suspicion score (0.4)
True Positive Rate 62.1% 44.1%
True Negative Rate 97.7% 100%
False Positive Rate 2.3% 0%
False Negative Rate 37.8% 55.8%
Accuracy 62% 45%
Precision 99.9% 100%
Table 6.6: Accuracy metrics
We also note that with an increase in threshold of the suspicion score, though
the false positives have become null, the false negatives have risen to 55%. For
anti-virus companies, it is important to measure not only their detection capabilities
but also the trustworthiness. One of the important aspects is the anti-virus product’s
tendency to flag clean files as infected, which causes greater concerns and results
in bad reputation to the company. These false alarms can result in more damage
than a real infection. Hence, there is a small tradeoff to stay as low as possible on
the false positives ratio even if that causes an increase in false negatives. Moreover,
this method, when used in addition to the already existing classification methods
to classify malware samples, results in significant increase in overall classification
accuracy of the anti-virus engine. This method acts supplementary to the existing
server-side classification methods at F-Secure that process millions of URLs and files
everyday and assign a reputation to each of them.
6.3.2 Classification of the download URLs
In addition to malicious downloader samples, our algorithm can also find possibly
infected download URLs which are used as a medium to spread the malicious payloads.
These download URLs are mostly short lived and are used just for the purpose of
spreading malware payloads. Usually, once anti-virus engines start to blacklist these
URLs, the attackers take them down and create more new URLs and every day, more
and more new malicious URLs are being created30.
In this experiment, we identify unknown download URLs as malicious or trusted
and verify the results against the ground truth. Table 6.7 lists the results of the
experiment of identifying unknown download URLs.
We verified these results against the same ground truth data which includes
VirusTotal and F-Secure malware classification system. From Table 6.8, it is clear
that about 331 of the 337 URLs were already identified by F-Secure engine and 1
30http://arstechnica.com/security/2012/06/google-detects-9500-new-malicious-websites-daily/
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Type Numbers
Total unlabelled download URLs 452
Malicious 337
Trusted 115
Table 6.7: Results of the experiment- download URLs
URL from identified from VirusTotal. This method increases the existing backend
malware classification rate of URLs at F-Secure by about 0.2%.
Download URLs classified as ‘malicious’ Numbers
F-Secure 331
VirusTotal (VT) 1
Manual analysis 0
By our method = Sum(F-Secure + VT + Manual analysis) 332
False Positives (FP) 5
Table 6.8: Statistics of the URL classification
The overall accuracy metrics of the classification of URLs are mentioned in
Table 6.9. This experiment returned a high false negative rate which implies that the
algorithm classifies more malicious URLs as trusted. This is because the algorithm
explores the neighborhood of only malicious payload samples to classify malicious
URLs associated with them, whereas the input test dataset from F-Secure at that
point of time has a number of ‘unknown’ payloads resulting in false negatives. This
can be reduced if the reputation labels of the unknown payloads is known before the
experiments.
True Positive Rate 81.3%
True Negative Rate 90.6%
False Positive Rate 10.4%
False Negative Rate 18.6%
Accuracy 80%
Precision 98.5%
Table 6.9: Accuracy of the URLs predicted
Overall, it is clear from the above experimental results, that the proposed method
works well to identify unknown downloaders, if the reputation of the payload samples
is known. For unknown payload samples, there is little information to make a decision
on the download URLs or the downloader samples. With increase in classification
of malicious payloads or with the addition of metrics such as WHOIS and domain
hits information, we can further improve the True Positive Rate of classification of
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both the downloaders and the download URLs. Hence, this method could result in
increase in the malware classification accuracy, when used in combination with other
traditional methods.
6.4 Exploration of Malware Patterns
Malware attackers use several obfuscation methods such as domain generation,
domain fluxing, etc. to make detection of their infrastructure even harder for the
anti-virus products [24]. Some malware leverage the security vulnerabilities found
on existing innocent servers to distribute the actual malicious code. This usually
makes it hard for the anti-virus products to detect malware when they are hosted on
legitimate servers. Tables 6.10 and 6.11 list a snapshot of the download URLs from
the test dataset. These URLs are used by the malware families called ‘Locky’ and
‘Dridex’ to distribute malicious payloads. Locky is a ransomware that encrypts the
victim’s machines and demands a ransom in order to retrieve the victim’s files. These
websites have no similarities between them except the fact that they all have been
compromised and leveraged by the attackers for spreading the malware infection.
These set of download URLs are a perfect example where the same malicious payload
is being hosted on multiple websites and are downloaded via multiple downloader
samples.
OrientDB has a visualization interface31 that can be used to explore data visually
with the use of simple SQL-like queries or manual traversal of the data. Figure 6.1 is a
sample snapshot of some Locky downloaders connecting to 3 compromised download
URLs, all of which download the same malicious payload. This shows how Locky
ransomware operates via compromised servers to spread infection. The downloaders
used by Locky are Microsoft Office Word documents, which when opened, use macro
scripts to contact these compromised servers. When a user requests a webpage
found on such infected servers, they are at high risk of downloading file samples
with malicious code and getting infected32. It is worth mentioning that for space
constraints, Figure 6.1 represents only a small portion of the total number of Locky
malware samples that are present in the test dataset.
On the other hand, Dridex is a banking trojan which also follows the same
technique but steals banking information from the victims. Dridex operates similar
to Locky in using compromised servers to spread malware33 and this is obvious from
the graph exploration snapshot of Dridex shown in Figure 6.2.
Hence, in addition to identifying individual malicious downloaders and download
URLs, our method is effective in identifying the infrastructure of malware distribution
by means of graph exploration. For instance, there are similar patterns of distribu-
tion between Locky Ransomware and Dridex banking trojan. Both these malware
campaigns happened at different time periods34 but their behavior and distribution
31http://orientdb.com/docs/2.1/Home-page.html
32http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/locky-ransomware-aggressive-hunt-victims
33http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/locky-new-ransomware-mimics-dridex-
style-distribution/
34http://www.pcworld.com/article/3033886/locky-ransomware-which-infects-like-dridex-hits-
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method is similar which is evident from Figures 6.1 and 6.2. With the help of the
visualization interface of OrientDB, exploration of patterns in large amounts of data
is easier and faster when compared to manual co-relation of information from different
reputation services. With current system, the above scenario of exploring similarities
between two different families of malware would require intense manual effort and
analysis by the anti-malware analysts when compared to using graph modeling and
visualization.
Distribution URLs of Locky
http://www.rbb.ru/grh5444tg
http://ernetfree.net/grh5444tg
http://denzil.com.au/grh5444tg
http://habr.net/grh5444tg
http://www.haldensleben-web.de/grh5444tg
Table 6.10: Distribution URLs for Locky
Distribution URLs of Dridex
http://www.apparelbycheryl.com/9uh87g756
http://ernetfree.net/grh5444tg
http://www.studiopanella.it/9uh87g756
http://www.kosmetikafm.wz.cz/9uh87g756
http://www.pececitos.com/9uh87g756
http://www.cdc-ccd.org/9uh87g756
Table 6.11: Distribution URLs for Dridex
the-unlucky.html
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Figure 6.1: Locky Ransomware distribution
6.5 Evaluation of Solution Requirements
As mentioned in Chapter 3, our system is expected to meet the following 4 require-
ments. Here, we evaluate the four requirements with the results achieved.
• R1
From our experimental results, it is evident that the algorithm was able to
identify unknown downloaders with an accuracy of 62% and unknown URLs
with an accuracy of 80%. Hence, the requirement R1 is met.
• R2
From the graph patterns displayed in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, it is evident that
the system enables anti-malware analysts explore large amount of data via the
visualization interface faster than the current method. This helps anti-malware
analysts at Labs uncover patterns in large amounts of data with less effort.
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Figure 6.2: Dridex malware distribution
• R3
In the experimental results for identifying unknown downloader samples, we
received an FPR of 0% and a high FNR of 55.8% , when the suspicion score
was set to 0.4. This proves that the method is able to fulfil requirement R3,
which expects the solution to have an FPR of not more than 3% along with
significant classification accuracy.
• R4
Finally, the system is able to identify some malware downloader samples
that are not identified by the existing classification methods at F-Secure,
thereby improving the current classification performance by 10% as stated in
requirement R4.
Thus, the system is able to fulfil all of the four solution requirements defined in
Chapter 3.
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6.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the algorithm with different input
metrics. We study the running time of the algorithm for various in-degree values of
the payload vertices and then, we repeat the same evaluation for the in-degree of the
download URL vertices.
6.6.1 Payload In-degree Analysis
For the first evaluation experiment, we vary the in-degree of the payload nodes in the
graph to study the performance of the algorithm. We pick the payload’s in-degree
measure because our method traverses the download URLs of each payload and
in turn, the downloader samples of each download URL. Hence, the algorithm is
majorly dependent on the number of in edges to the payload samples. As already
mentioned in Section 5, the running time of our algorithm is O ( u + d + p ), where
u is the number of download URLs, d is the number of downloaders and p is the
number of payloads. This implies that the running time depends on the in degree
of the payload samples as the higher the in-degree, the higher the number of URL
nodes to traverse in the graph. We evaluate this claim by running the algorithm
repeatedly for different payload samples in the increasing order of their in-degree
and document the results.
Degree Range Number of Downloaders Run time (seconds)
1-3 185 1.417
4-7 305 1.751
8-15 388 1.779
16-30 674 6.462
31-60 264 1.674
Table 6.12: Payload in-degree Vs Run time
From Table 6.12, we note that with increasing in-degree, the run time of the
algorithm increases linearly. We notice that the number of downloaders increases
exponentially when the in degree is increased from the range 8 -15 to 16-30. This
subsequently results in the exponential increase in the run time of the algorithm. We
also note that there are less number of downloaders for the payloads with in-degree
between 31 and 60. Due to this, the running time of the algorithm for these nodes
falls to a lower value. Figure 6.3 shows the behaviour of the algorithm when we vary
the in degree of payload samples from 1 to 60.
6.6.2 URL In-degree Analysis
For the second evaluation experiment, we vary the in-degree of the download URL
nodes in the graph to study the performance of the algorithm. In addition to payload
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Figure 6.3: Payload In-degree vs Run time
in-degree, URL in-degree also decides the number of nodes analyzed in the graph.
This implies that the algorithm running time increases as in-degree of the download
URLs increase. We evaluate this claim by running the algorithm repeatedly for
different download URLs in the increasing order of their in degree and document the
results.
Degree Range Run time (seconds)
1-3 1.906
4-7 2.131
8-15 2.159
16-30 2.469
31-60 3.581
Table 6.13: URL In-degree Vs Run time
From Table 6.13, we note that with increasing in-degree of download URLs, the
run time of the algorithm increases linearly. Figure 6.4 shows the behaviour of the
algorithm when we vary the in-degree of download URLs from 1 to 60. This is due to
the fact that when a download URL vertex has more incoming edges, the algorithm
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would have to traverse more edges.
In this section, we evaluated the algorithm with different input measures to study
how the algorithm behaves. The results show that the performance of the algorithm
is highly dependent on the number of payloads and downloaders that are present
in the input dataset. With smaller in-degree values for the payloads, the algorithm
takes very less time in traversing the nodes and vice versa. Similar behaviour is
observed for a smaller out-degree of the download URL nodes as well.
Figure 6.4: URL In-degree vs Run time
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7 Conclusion
In this work, we formulate a graph-modeling problem for identifying unknown files
and URLs with the help of the malware classification datasets at F-Secure Labs. We
develop an iterative graph-based algorithm that can identify unknown downloader
samples and download URLs. We evaluate the system using 4 months malware
reputation data from F-Secure backend systems. Our experimental results show that
the solution has effectively met the initial requirements that were defined during the
problem definition. The system is able to automatically construct a graph model
from the existing malware reputation systems, NRS and FRS, using OrientDB graph
database. The system also meets the goal of identifying potential malware using
graph traversal and mining techniques with 0% FPR. This solution functions in
addition to the existing server-side malware classification methods and improves
the current classification performance of malware at F-Secure by atleast 10%. The
method is even able to identify few malware that are not currently identified by
any of the anti-virus vendors in the market. Moreover, our solution is instrumental
in exploring the infrastructures of some malware and thereby uncover the common
patterns between malware. Hence, these results prove the accuracy and efficiency of
our algorithm with real-world malware classification data.
7.1 Future Work
As future work, there are a number of improvements that can be made to the existing
solution.
• Currently, the graph algorithm works the best in providing improved classifica-
tion when there are enough malicious payloads in the input dataset. This can
be improved by also traversing from unknown payloads to explore unknown
download URLs and using additional parameters like WHOIS, number of URL
hits to predict unknown URLs, in addition to their neighborhood.
• The input data to the current systems is from one of the many data source
systems at F-Secure. Due to the query limitations of this system, the number
of input samples for the experiments were limited for this study. But future
work can combine multiple data sources to have a large input datasets to make
better decisions.
• For this study, we only identify unknown downloaders and download URLs.
However, this method can be combined with machine learning to design classi-
fiers that can be trained to even predict the maliciousness of payloads when
there is not enough relationship information available.
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• The system can be improved by using complex graph analysis methods namely
Page Rank, Random-Walk, etc. to extract more meaningful results from the
graphs
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A Appendix A
In this section, we list the malware terminologies for quick reference.
Term Synonyms Description
Malware Malicious software, infected file. Malicious programs which may in-
clude virus, worm, Trojan etc.
Reputation Goodness or maliciousness, classi-
fication labels, detection.
A measure of goodness, can be
used for URLs, files etc.
File sample File, Sample, Software, exe-
cutable, program, application.
A software instance, typically an
executable file. Also mean word
documents with embedded macros
in this document.
URL Webpage, URL link. Uniform resource locator that rep-
resents a single web page docu-
ment.
Downloader Downloader sample, Downloader
file.
A computer program, which aids
in downloading supplementary
files.
Payload Payload sample. Payload file. The eventual part of malware
which performs a malicious action.
Malware Classifi-
cation
Malware categorization, classifica-
tion, detection.
The act of setting labels to un-
known files and URls based on
how they get executed, how they
spread, and/or what they do.
Table A.1: Malware detection terminology
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B Appendix B
B.1 Graph Data Load Scripts
Figures B.1 and B.2 display the database load scripts used to load the datasets from
the NRS and FRS systems onto the OrientDB Graph database. The vertex and edge
definitions of the graph are specified in these scripts.
Figure B.1: Load FRS Data
Figure B.2: Load NRS Data
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C Appendix C
C.1 OrientDB Database Screenshots
Figures C.1 and C.2 show the visual editor of OrientDB for viewing the graph data
and exploring patterns using traversal queries.
Figure C.1: OrientDB Database
Figure C.2: OrientDB Graph Editor
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D Appendix D
D.1 Sample Graph Snapshots
Figures D.1 and D.2 display sample graph cluster snapshots from the test dataset.
Figure D.1: Graph Snapshot 1
Figure D.2: Graph Snapshot 2
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